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Introduction      
         
Of all the great religions of the world today, no one makes as often the headlines 
as Islam, whether in the guise of criticism of its allegedly inherent abuses or in reaction 
to such criticism accused of "Islamophobia". What explains the "Islamic anger" that 
periodically explodes around the world in reaction to real or imagined insults related to 
                                                          
1 Article based on a lecture given at the First International Symposium of the Southeast Brazilian Association 
of History of Religions (ABHR), Sudeste da ABHR Associação Brasileira de História das Religiões (ABHR), 
1o Simpósio Internacional da ABHR, “Diversidade e (In)Tolerâncias Religiosas” ("Diversity and (In) 
Religious Tolerance"), São Paulo, October 31, 2013, subsequently published as in Eduardo Meinberg de 
Albuquerque Maranhão Filho (Org.), Religiões e religiosiddaes em (Con)textos 2. Fonte Editorial, 2015.  We 
use here the term Islamophobia despite its unfortunate connotations. Earlier proposals for a more neutral 
nomenclature of the phenomenon of prejudice, hatred and/or discrimination and/or harassment of 
Muslims and/or their religion the Islam, by non-Muslims included "anti-Muslimism" in parallel with anti-
Semitism (cf. Halliday (1999), p. 160-194); "anti-Muslim racism" and "Muslimophobia" (cf. Göndör 
(2013)): "anti-Islamism" and "Islamoprejudice" (cf. Imhoff & Recker (2012)). These terms have not found 
wide acceptance. The word Islamophobia, literally "fear of Islam", is an invention of the British antiracist 
think tank the Runnymede Trust. Islamist intellectuals subsequently adopted it to delegitimize criticism, 
ridicule and blasphemy of Islam (cf. Conway (1997). Next the term was adopted by official Islamic 
associations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in the latter’s ongoing campaign to 
prohibit such criticism, in parallel to bans already in force against racism and anti-Semitism (i.a. at the 
UN). There is no consensus as to whether Islamophobia should be understood as a form of racism. Then 
the term also came to include discrimination of Muslims regardless of their faith: the concept thus 
amalgamates an opaque mix of illegitimate phenomena. However, it has gained acceptance, and we use it 
in a neutral and purely descriptive manner. (Incidentally the term anti-Semitism, nowadays universally 
used, stems from no less controversial roots, and has no fewer disadvantages; also here alternatives such 
as "Judeophobia" (Rodinson) never caught on). Cf. Malik (2009), Bruckner (2011), and Fourest & Venner 
(2003), in particular pp. 230-280 ("Une nouvelle stratégie: censurer au nom de l'anntiracisme"). 
2 Prof. Dr. Peter Robert Demant is historian and observer of International Relations, specializing in Middle 
East issues, the Muslim world and Islam-West relations. Ph.D. in Modern and Contemporary History at 
Amsterdam University (1988), and “Livre-Docência” in Contemporary History, University of São Paulo USP 
(2007). Currently associate professor at USP History Department, also lecturing at the Institute of 
International Relations (IRI-USP), Demant is also coordinator of the Asian Studies Laboratory (LEA-USP) 
and responsible for its Middle East and Islamic World Working Group (GTOMMM). 
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either the content or the taboos of that religion? It is justified? How should the non-
Islamic world deal with it? Should it at all be allowed to criticize Islam? Where are the 
alternative Muslim voices, more open to dialogue? These are the questions that guide 
this article. 
Our starting point is the grossly Islamophobic video "Innocence of Muslims" 
(IoM) aired on YouTube in July 2012, of "Sam Bacile", or Nakouka Basseley Nakoula, an 
Egyptian Copt living in California. The trailer shows passive Egyptian security forces as 
Muslims set fire and loot homes of Egyptian Christians. After that the short movie passes 
to parodied "historical" scenes that depict the Prophet of Islam as a clown, a seducer, 
homosexual, pedophile, and a bloodthirsty and sadistic thief.3 
These insults to the Prophet Muhammad triggered in September of the same year 
a wave of protests and riots across the Muslim world, resulting in at least 29 deaths. It is 
also known that anti-American attacks of the jihadist outfit Ansar al-Shari‘a in Benghazi, 
Libya that cost US Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens his life, were partly motivated by 
the movie. Outraged Muslims demanded its immediate withdrawal and an apology from 
the United States. The US government disavowed the movie but claimed not to pull it off 
the net due to US law protecting freedom of expression. YouTube argued that the film 
criticized Islam’s religious ideas, which is legitimate, but did not insult Muslims as a 
group - in the latter case it might have been understood as racism and/or be banned.4 
The issue allows us at once to distinguish two recurring aspects in the discussion: 
1) the relationship (contradiction or overlap) between free speech and hate 
speech. What makes up insult or blasphemy (offense to God) and what characterizes its 
opposite, respect? And what should prevail, respect and absence of insult or absolute 
freedom of expression, even to the point of including freedom to insult? 
2) the responsibility of the author for his/her words and works, and the 
relationship between criticism (or joke, which is a benign form of insult) which may 
include an element of verbal or symbolic violence - and physical violence? Do hate 
speech and criticism lead to or facilitate violence? What is the responsibility of the one 
who expresses a thought for the consequences flowing from that thought?  
 
 
                                                          
3 Kirkpatrick (2012). 
4 Cain-Miller (2012). Cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Innocence_of_muslims#cite_ref-nytimes-youtube-
rethink_70-1. 
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1. Free speech versus hate speech 
 
Background: precedents 
 
IoM is one of the latest scandals, but it is not an isolated case of censorship for 
religious reasons. Within the Christian world, publications, artwork, opinions expressed 
in public speeches or in the classroom which hurt Christian sensibilities, caused from 
partial and a posteriori censorship to torture and execution of "blasphemers", "heretics" 
or "heathens". Such incidents have marked the West’s entire intellectual history. The 
struggle to conquer a legitimate space for intellectual and/or scientific challenge is 
hardly less ancient, and constituted a chief element of the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment. The resulting freedom of expression has become a cornerstone of 
modernity and the memory of these struggles, an integral part of our canonical narrative 
of emancipation. 
Other civilizations also faced with tensions between the spheres of the sacred 
and inviolable, and those of free thought, artistic expression, and the desire of 
knowledge. Thus in imperial China limitations imposed by Confucian orthodoxy on 
scientific research may in the long run have been fatal to creativity and even a factor in 
Chinese resistance to Western influences.5 In a more recent past, thought controls in the 
Communist Soviet Union are now considered to have been obstacles that hampered its 
computer revolution and caused it to stay behind   the US. The Islamic world too has had 
its share of impediments to free expression. Some well-known infamous episodes 
include the destruction of the library of Alexandria in 642 AD; establishment of an 
inquisition of ahl al-hadith (Hanbalis) by mu‘tazilites in the Abbasid caliphate (followed 
by a reverse persecution); and prohibiting printing in Arabic letters (though not in 
Hebrew) in the Ottoman Empire in 1515.6 However, such intolerance was the exception 
rather than the rule. During the Golden Age there was a greater freedom of expression in 
Islam than in medieval Christendom, allowing for a flourishing not only of arts and 
                                                          
5 Elvin (1973) p. 225-234. 
6 The traditional story of the destruction of the Alexandria library by Amr ibn al-`As on orders of Caliph 
`Umar is contested by several sources, cf. Lewis (1990) and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Destruction_of_the_Library_of_Alexandria. Cf. Hodgson (1974) p. 384-392; 
437-442. The ban on printing in the Ottoman Empire was softened at the end of the 16th century, yet a 
press in Turkish and Arabic letters only took off in the 19th century: Lewis (1968) p. 50-51. Cf. also 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Printing. 
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literature but also of medicine, natural, human and social sciences.7 Even the freedom to 
criticize religion has not always been as limited as it is now. The image of the Prophet 
himself could be represented without major problems.8 In the 20th century criticism of 
religion has remained a source of problems in several countries where religious 
authorities command influence of, such as the Catholic Church in the Philippines or in 
Argentina before Perón, or the Buddhist hierarchy in Tibet before 1958 to the openly 
atheistic and antireligious communist regimes of the USSR and China. But in no religion 
has the issue of freedom to criticize become so central as in Islam. 
The exacerbation of conflict over freedom of expression in Islam is, however, 
relatively recent. The novel The Satanic Verses (1989) of Anglo-Indian author Salman 
Rushdie was arguably the first case of a book indirectly critical of religion to cause a 
response of a never seen magnitude around the Muslim world, culminating in the fatwa 
in which Ayatollah Khomeini sentenced the author to death for blasphemy. 
In more than one way the Rushdie affair became the prototype of a whole 
sequence of scandals. In 1994 the Bangladeshi writer Taslima Nasrin faced persecution 
because of her anti-fundamentalist novel Lajja ("Shame"). The following year the 
rationalistic and atheistic Pakistani journalist Ibn Warraq published his criticism of 
Islam Why I am not a Muslim 1995).9 Since then he regularly needs police protection to 
speak in public. In 2003 the Dutch-Somali politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali produced together 
with journalist Theo van Gogh the film Submission, a documentary that projected verses 
from the Koran on the naked bodies of women, as a kind of criticism of the position of 
women in Islam. Van Gogh was killed by a radical Islamist, and the life of Hirsi Ali, 
threatened. In 2005, publication by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten of cartoons 
depicting the Prophet Muhammad led to an international scandal. The crisis has affected 
the relationship of Denmark with Muslim countries, which called for a ban of the 
publication. Cartoonist Kurt Westergaard was threatened and in demonstrations that 
                                                          
7 Extensive scientific and cultural advance took also place in the natural sciences, i.a. in algebra, astronomy, 
and optics; in humanities (e.g. grammar); and in social science, e.g. by Ibn Khaldun, the well-known 14th 
century precursor of sociology). 
8 The recent taboo against any figurative representation of the Prophet reached an almost absurd climax 
when radical Muslims demanded in 2008 that Wikipedia remove a 17th century illustration showing 
Muhammad from its article that itself explains the evolution of the taboo: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Depictions_of_Muhammad. 
9 Ibn Warraq is a pseudonym, the author’s real name remains unknown. He leads a group of "secular 
Muslims" at the Institute for the Secularisation of Islamic Society (ISIS): 
http://www.centerforinquiry.net/isis/. 
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followed around the Islamic world, ca. 40 people lost their lives.10 The best known of 
these cartoons represented Islam's prophet with a bomb hidden in his turban, to 
symbolize the supposed link between Islam and terrorism. Ironically, the cartoons were 
part of a campaign to criticize what the newspaper saw as excessive self-censorship in 
Western media regarding problematic phenomena within Islam. 
In 2006 a new storm arose because of a speech given by the pope at Regensburg 
University. Benedict XVI quoted an opinion of Islam given by Byzantine emperor Manuel 
II Palaeologos (14th-15th century) accusing the “religion of peace" of violent tendencies. 
Violent protests against that claim once again resulted in several deaths. In 2008 Fitna, 
an openly anti-Islamic video of Dutch right-wing politician Geert Wilders led to attempts 
to ban the video. In 2009 Wilders was blocked from visiting the UK although he was 
later admitted.11  In 2010, extremist Protestant pastor Terry Jones of Florida announced 
that he would publicly burn Korans. He dropped his plan under political pressure, but 
the news provoked deadly riots in Afghanistan and elsewhere (Jones burned the Holy 
Book anyway a year later, and this became the trigger for renewed protests). In 2011 
and 2012, French satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo, with no specifically anti-Islamic 
prehistory but very committed to freedom of expression, published cartoons of 
Muhammad (among other religious figures).12 In January 2015 eight of its journalists 
and four others were murdered by the Kouachis, two al-Qaeda in Yemen-related 
brothers. Five more were killed during the terrorists’ pursuit which ended in their 
death. Two days later their friend Amedy Coulibaly went on a rampage and killed four 
patrons of a Jewish supermarket in Paris. 
This short list of incidents is far from exhaustive. Most cases occur in the Muslim 
world itself and these rarely hit the headlines of Western media. Anyway, when Nakoula 
put his movie on YouTube, he joined an already long history of anti-Western Islamic 
friction regarding freedom of expression. Some cases involve explicitly and deliberately 
offensive representations, but these are a minority. Among the issues deemed offensive 
and showing "lack of respect" one finds a whole range of artistic, or just opinionating, 
                                                          
10 In addition to ca. 150 dead in anti-Christian pogroms triggered by protests against the cartoons in 
Nigeria: Tattersall (2010). 
11 Australia also tried to deny Wilders a visa. He was tried in the Netherlands for violating its anti-hate 
speech laws but acquitted in 2011: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geert_Wilders#In_the_United_Kingdom 
12 Fitna translates as temptation or anarchy, which may refer either to 7th century CE intra-Islamic civil 
wars or to female attraction. Dove World Outreach Center Pastor Jones has also been involved in 
disseminating the IoM video: Fisher (2012). 
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and even scientific expressions. It is therefore essential to differentiate the critique of 
Islam from ridiculing that religion. And it is no less important to differentiate between 
criticizing the Islamic religion per se and sowing seeds of hatred and contempt of 
Muslims. 
We may thus identify three categories of "offenses": artistic production, scientific 
research, and Islamophobic propaganda proper. From a liberal and secular point of view 
(i.e. one not committed a priori to the truth of any specific worldview), only the third 
group fits the category of objectionable of hate speech. It is important to distinguish 
between these categories, for they show that there is a whole range of expressions that, 
even if loathsome to many or most Muslims, are still legitimate and deserving of 
protection. 
 
 
 (1) Artistic production  
 
In the first, artistic and philosophical, category, one finds novels, including 
satirical ones, paintings, movies, music,13 films, essays, as well as jokes and cartoonsAlso 
political opinions or philosophical essays may include criticism of religion in general 
(e.g. Hobbes or Schopenhauer) or of any faith in particular, for instance of Islam. There 
exists in the West a long line of anti-Christian or in general antireligious thinkers and 
authors. Voltaire and Hume are just two of them. In recent days, biologist Richard 
Dawkins and journalist Christopher Hitchens follow the same critical tradition.14 
However, works critical of Christianity also risk irritating Muslim sensibilities, since 
figures such as the Virgin Mary (Maryam) or Jesus (the Prophet 'Issa) are also respected 
in Islam. Thus the film The Last Temptation of Christ by Martin Scorsese (1989, based on 
the novel of Nikos Kazantzakis) stoked Muslim anger with its representation of the 
Christ as a fallible human being who could fall in love with a woman. Israel banned the 
movie to avoid problems with the Muslim minority. Greece, Turkey, Mexico, Chile, 
                                                          
13 For fear of Muslim reactions the Deutsche Oper Berlin withdrew from its 2006 programming Hans 
Neuenfels’ production of Mozart's opera Idomeneo, which included the severed heads of Jesus, Buddha and 
Mohammed as a symbol of emancipation of religion: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Idomeneo_controversy. 
14 Dawkins (2006). The book was prosecuted as blasphemous in Turkey, but the case was dismissed: cf. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20071129222236/http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/11/28/d
awkins.turkey.ap/index.html. Richard Dawkins discussed his atheistic views with journalist Mehdi Hassan 
on the show "Head to Head" of al-Jazeera: Dawkins (2013). 
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Argentina, the Philippines, and Singapore also banned the film.  
 
(2) Scientific research 
 
A second category includes works of serious research that directly or indirectly 
criticize aspects of Islam. "Orientalist" studies developed historically from anti-Islamic 
Christian polemics, which since the Middle Ages had depicted the Prophet of Islam as 
fraudulent, the Koran as a case of plagiarism or a "second hand Bible", and in general 
adopted extremely hostile (as well as quite ignorant) postures vis-à-vis Islam. All the 
same, whatever its origins (and regardless of criticisms of supposed political use of the 
work of these "Orientalists"), the study has become since the 19th century a reputable 
and legitimate science, similar in its methodology to sinology or African or Latin 
American studies.15 Orientalist scholars analyzing Islamic sources sometimes come to 
conclusions incompatible with the fundamentals of religion, just as previously critical 
Bible scholars provoked the wrath of the church when they showed that the Pentateuch 
could not have been written entirely by Moses, or when they pointed at discrepancies 
among the four Gospels regarding the life of Jesus Christ. 
Serious Islam scholars concentrate nowadays on two dimensions: (a) the origins 
of the sacred sources, and (b) contradictions between Islamic morality and Western 
human rights. Both issues, incidentally, exercise also the best progressive Muslim 
creative minds - and hurt the sensibilities of the most conservative. 
(a) Among the most controversial subjects in the first group is that of the 
authenticity of the Qur'an and its internal contradictions. The following few examples 
illustrate how scholarly opinion may touch a raw nerve with Muslim readers. Western 
researchers have since the 19th century reconstructed the presence of external, e.g. 
Jewish, influences on the content and text of Islam’s sacred sources. Joseph Schacht 
showed in 1950 that the vast majority of the ahadith - even those tradition accepts as 
authentic – do not date back to Muhammad. Based on the oldest manuscripts of the 
Qur’an (found in Yemen), Gerd Puin concludes that the text had not yet been fully 
                                                          
15 The most important critiques of the Orientalist tradition are in Abdel Malek (1963) (pp. 103-140) and 
Said (1978). Irwin (2006) analyzes the growth of Oriental Studies as a science (and strongly criticizes 
Said). 
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consolidated in 671.16 Patricia Crone and Michael Cook in their book Hagarism (1977) 
tried to prove - basing their argument on the absence of contemporary secondary 
sources - that our current Qur'an could not have been compiled before ca. 700 AD, i.e. 70 
years after the Prophet's death. That would give short shrift to the dogma that the text 
was received as such by the Messenger and is literally God’s word.17 There are even 
those who doubt the historicity of Muhammad, deconstructing him as a mythological 
figure.18 Many of these scholars are not guided by any a priori anti-Islamic animus but by 
the search for historical truth. However, some of their findings are inconsistent with 
Islamic faith as understood by most faithful - and deeply uncomfortable for many of 
them. Reactions may be extreme. Several researchers have been threatened, and publish 
under pseudonym. Another emblematic case was that of the late Egyptian Islamologist 
Nasr Abu-Zayd, whose application of the philological method to the Qur’an led Muslim 
fundamentalists to sue the author for apostasy. Under Egyptian law, derived from the 
shari‘a, and unlike Western positive natural law, blasphemy, adultery and various other 
"crimes" do not fall under the civil law where the injured party must prove the damage 
to his person, but under the rubric of "war against God", so anyone can, in the name of 
the of the hisba principle ("ordering the good and forbidding evil") lodge a complaint 
against the accused. Once it was determined that the defendant had betrayed Islam in 
his publications, and was therefore no longer a Muslim, he was sentenced in 1993 to 
divorce his wife: marriage of a Muslim with a non-Muslim is forbidden. The couple took 
refuge in Holland, where Abu Zayd was hosted by Leiden University. The case is 
extreme, but not unique. It is useful to remember that within Islamic milieus, the latitude 
to criticize used to be much wider in the past than it is today. And openness to take 
criticism is often an indicator of force rather than of weakness.19 
(b) Also the question "human rights and Islam" is broad, and the bibliography 
                                                          
16 In July 2015 a manuscript was identified as being the oldest Qur’an text extant, possibly dating back to 
the Prophet’s lifetime:  'Oldest' Koran fragments found in Birmingham University. BBC 22-7-2015: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-33436021. For some critical reactions, cf. The Guardina 22-7-2015 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/22/oldest-quran-fragments-found-at-birmingham-
university, and JihadWarch 22-7-2015 http://www.jihadwatch.org/2015/07/oldest-quran-fragments-in-
the-world-discovered-in-the-uk-maybe-maybe-not. 
17 Joseph Schacht (1950), Ohlig & Puin (2009). Reception of Crone and Cook’s book was not positive, and 
Liaquat Ali Khan (2006) claims they have recently mitigated his thesis, but this remains uncertain. Cf. 
Crone (2008). 
18 Christoph Luxenberg (2011) is also a pseudonym. Cf. Magister (2004). John Wansbrough (1977 and 
1978) has attempted deconstruction of the canonical version of the origins of Islam (Irwin 2006 op. cit., 
pp. 268-273). Wansbrough and Spencer have questioned the historical existence of Muhammad. 
19 About Nasr Abu Zayd cf. Eltahawy (1999). 
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shows a range of well-known dilemmas: freedom of religion (or of missionizing, or of 
leaving Islam, or even of not accepting any religion) is severely circumscribed in 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, for both non-Muslims and Muslims who 
differ from the orthodoxy in power; physical punishments such as flogging of 
'disobedient' women, stoning of adulterers, amputation of hand of thieves such as take 
place in Iran; crucifixion of apostates in Yemen and elsewhere by al-Qaeda militia, or 
repression of homosexuality (and of many other expressions of sexuality outside 
marriage) in many African states, in Iran, Pakistan and elsewhere; anti-Semitism, 
ubiquitous in Gaza under Hamas; discrimination against Christians and Hindus, common 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan under the Taliban and growing in Egypt, Iraq, and areas of 
Syria "liberated" by al-Qaeda and related groups; slavery unacceptable to non-Muslims, 
but officially practiced in Saudi Arabia until 1960 and until 2007 in Mauritania - but 
unofficially still frequent there and elsewhere; and violent jihad as a religious duty, 
which serves as justification for terrorism for a plethora of extreme Islamist groups 
(which obviously does not cancel the value of jihad as spiritual struggle). 
 
 
(3) Islamophobic propaganda 
 
Artistic, philosophical and/or scientific expressions incompatible with, or critical 
of Islam must be distinguished from actual anti-Islamic propaganda (although they 
might theoretically go together) which includes expressions custom tailored to cause 
pain and anger among the victims, and to provoke discrimination, hatred and even 
violent action among their victimizers. IoM undoubtedly belongs to this third category: 
hate speech. 
Again Muslims are not the only ones to have suffered persecution. The parallels 
with many other minority groups or discriminated outsiders is undeniable: Blacks, 
Freemasons, women, homosexuals and the hated minority par excellence - the Jews. 
There are clear parallels between the anti-Semitic discourse that has permeated 
European history, from the Church Fathers to Wagner, and today’s Islamophobic 
arguments of former Front National leader Jean-Marie Le Pen in France or the late Jörg 
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Haider of the Austrian Freedom Party.20 From this point of view Europe’s Muslims are 
not fundamentally different from earlier minorities. On the other hand, it is equally 
undeniable that a correct citizenship education can reduce bias. Sometimes progress is 
so fast that the previous, deplorable, situation is soon forgotten. 50 years ago jokes 
about "crazies", disabled and Blacks were common and acceptable. One of Hergé’s first 
albums, Tintin in Congo (1931), represented the Congolese as caricatures of Blacks with 
full lips and speaking a pitiful dialect. Yet no one thought to ban Tintin.21 The public and 
legal acceptance of homosexuality in the West is amounts to a social revolution – just 
one generation homosexual acts were still punishable in England, in several US States, 
and in Latin America.22 Following these precedents, it is conceivable that the integration 
of Muslims, these days such a hot issue on the political agenda of most European states, 
might happen sooner than expected, once the right public policies were implemented. 
The question is whether tabooizing or even prohibiting criticism of Islam should be part 
of these policies. That is in fact the demand of the OIC. Islam is unique among all the 
great religions in its militancy on this point. This leads to the question of whence this 
hypersensitivity. 
  
 
Islam - more sensitive? 
 
More than other religions, Islam dictates the believers’ lifestyle and integrates 
them in an entire social and civilizational system. As a result, despite many variations, all 
Muslim societies share certain basic features.23 Islam inculcates in the faithful a sense of 
belonging to a shared supranational community. Studies document that, at least in the 
Middle East, people today tend to identify themselves as Muslim rather than as Arab or 
                                                          
20 Jean-Marie Le Pen (1972-2011) and his daughter Marine Le Pen (2011-) lead the French Right-wing 
anti-immigrant Front National (National Front; Jörg Haider was active in the FPO*  (Freedom Party of 
Austria) from 1974 to his death in 2008. 
21 Author Hergé (Georges Rémi) redrew the offending images in 1954. In 2007 a Congolese student tried 
to ban the book by racism: cf. Samuel (2011) and Hogg (2012). 
22 Brazil was one of the first countries to decriminalize homosexual activity, as early as 1830. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_status_of_homosexuality_in_Brazil; 
http://www.athosgls.com.br/comportamento_visualiza.php?contcod=15188 
23 Czech-British anthropologist Ernst Gellner observed, "For all the indisputable diversity, the remarkable 
thing is the extent to which Muslim societies resemble each other. (...) At least in the bulk of Muslim 
societies, in the main Islamic block between Central Asia and the Atlantic shores of Africa, one has the 
feeling that the same and limited pack of cards has been dealt. The hands vary, but the pack is the same." 
Gellner (1981), p. 99. 
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Egyptian, Syrian, etc. Moreover, Islam seems to evince greater sensitivity to expressions 
that might be construed as criticism. The junction of "over-identification" and "over-
sensitivity" expresses itself in a sequence of cries of pain and anger and in scandals that 
are often accompanied by violent anti-Western protests. How do people in the West 
respond? Reactions run the gamut from defensive counter-accusations to preventive 
self-censorship. The latter range from criticism of authors or artists targeted by insulted 
Muslims (equivalent to blaming the victim) to attempts to silence them. Some examples 
will illustrate the tendency. At the time of the fatwa against Rushdie, fellow author John 
Le Carré was one of several commentators who accused the author of the Satanic Verses 
of having provoked himself the reactions that now threatened his safety. During and 
after the scandal of the Danish Muhammad cartoons, CNN among other media refused to 
publish the polemical drawings so as not to irritate Muslim readers. Even more striking 
is a scientific study of the case whose editor, a university press, refused to illustrate the 
book with reproductions of the cartoons. The causes of this Western "politically correct" 
current (associated with the Left) to "protect" Islam are complex and fall outside the 
scope of this article.24 
The issue of Muslim hypersensitivity borders naturally on that of Islam’s 
supposedly violent inclination, so different from the understanding many Muslims 
themselves have that theirs is the religion of peace. In fact it would not be difficult to 
draft a long list of violent acts committed in the name of Islam (which is not identical 
with violence committed by Muslims), both in the past and today. Only in recent years 
we have seen massacres of Christians in Nigeria, Egypt, and Iraq, stoning of adulterous 
women in Somalia and Afghanistan, calls for the destruction of Israel by Iran and by al-
Qaeda, atrocities against Shiites in Iraq and Pakistan, murders of journalists and 
employees of aid organizations in Syria and Yemen, and so many other cases, and this 
lists just a small portion of the incidents.25 However, it is easy to put together similar 
lists for about any religion. The real question is whether Islam has more violent 
proclivity than other religions. And the answer to that question is far from evident. For 
very Muslim violence one can mention equivalent or worse violence committed in the 
                                                          
24 Spy novel author John Le Carré has recently recanted his attack on Rushdie: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/booknews/9671959/Le-Carre-regrets-Rushdie-fatwa-
feud.html. Cf. Klausen 2009; Bone 2009. 
25 On the putative Islam/terrorism link, a cursory glance at the list of victims of terrorist acts since the 
1970s shows the massive preponderance of violence by Islamist groups: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_battles_and_other_violent_events_by_death_toll#Terrorist_attacks 
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name, or by followers, of other religions. Just remember the terrible history of anti-
Semitism in Christian Europe, the Catholic Inquisition, and more recently the pogroms of 
anti-Islamic Buddhists in Sri Lanka. Besides, Muslims have been the victims of 
specifically anti-Muslim violence. Limiting ourselves to the current epoch, there has not 
only been European brutality against Muslim immigrants but also lethal Hindu violence 
against Muslims in India, or Buddhist anti-Muslim hostility in Burma. The list lends itself 
to expansion, and the debate would fall in a pingpong on what is worse, Islamist or 
Islamophobic violence - a tacky dispute between Anders Breivik and Osama bin Laden. 
There are organizations and websites entirely dedicated to documenting the "crimes" of 
the other side.26 The fact is, each religion possesses undeniably both a violent and a 
peaceful potential: which of these two trends turns significant or predominant at any 
given time or place is related to factors not necessarily linked to its theological content.27 
  
 
Minorities provoke protests 
 
They say that the difference between a practicing Muslim and an Islamist is that 
the practicing believer makes fasts on Ramadan while the Islamist wants to force 
everyone to obey the commandment of fasting. Many Muslim protests against instances 
of insult or blasphemy are the work of small activist minorities whose Islamist militancy 
ends up dragging along larger and more mainstream groups. Indeed, it is probably 
correct to say that in most "blasphemous outbreaks" both offenders and offended are 
initially small intolerant minorities. 
The case of IoM is typical. Unlike some other incidents mentioned above, there 
can be no doubt that the amateurish and vulgar video was made with the express 
purpose of offending, representing the Prophet of Islam as murderer, pedophile, and 
more. However, the corpus delicti was already for months on the Internet before being 
"discovered" by an Egyptian Salafi preacher, who in turn warned his followers: they are 
                                                          
2626 Much more physical violence by Muslims is reported in e.g. jihadwatch.org than anti-Muslim violence 
in e.g. islamophobia-watch.com. However, the latter site limits its scope to Europe and the US, where levels 
of violence are as such more verbal than physical (an example would be the campaign of anti-Islam 
propaganda promoted by Pamela Geller in the New York subway: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/15/pamela-geller-dc_n_2696907.html. 
27 Nor would it be correct to accuse religion in general, as demonstrated by last century’s genocides 
committed by non-religious or even atheist regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. 
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the ones who spread the theme of "attack on religion" and this triggered strings of 
protests around the Muslim world. Violent incidents caused the loss of around 50 lives, 
even though the protests were wide rather than deep. The dramatic images projected on 
television screens all over the world showed the destabilizing potential of the movement 
rather than its reality. In Pakistan for instance the largest protests mobilized angry 
groups of not more than 5000 people clamoring for revenge. Elsewhere, the numbers 
were even lower. Then, after a brief period of acute crisis, other international incidents 
drew away public attention. It was not known at the time that the attack of Libyan 
jihadists on the US consulate in Benghazi and the ambassador's murder, were also 
linked to IoM. The video soon fell into oblivion.28 
Similar domino effects had been responsible for the Rushdie crisis in the late 
1980s and for that of the Muhammad cartoons in 2005. Rushdie’s novel ridiculed Islam 
in an indirect way - so indirect in fact it must have gone unnoticed by many readers. One 
chapter describes a place reminiscent of Arabia and a brothel where all the prostitutes 
bear names of the Prophet’s wives. The writing is rather hermetic, further reducing 
dissemination. Still its message was recognized by Islamist activists in the UK, who 
judged it intolerable and organized demonstrations and public burnings of the book and 
of the author in effigy. In turn the waves raised in Britain echoed in other countries, at 
the cost of dozens of lives. Eventually they led Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Iranian 
Revolution, to proclaim a fatwa sentencing the author to death for blasphemy. The fatwa 
then became irrevocable due to the Ayatollah’s death of in 1989, condemning Rushdie to 
lead a reclusive life - and provoking an enduring crisis between Iran and the West 
(incidentally the radical posture of Iran, at the time the only Muslim state with a 
fundamentalist regime, helped nurture in the West the wrong but at the time popular 
impression that Shiites are inherently more radical and intolerant than Sunnis). 
In the case of the scandal surrounding the Prophet’s cartoons in the Danish daily 
Jyllands-Posten, the crisis took even longer to blow up. Months passed after publication 
of the cartoons before a small group of offended Danish Muslims produced a dossier 
they brought to Egypt and Saudi Arabia with the express purpose of "arousing" anger. 
The turning point came when the self-proclaimed representatives of Danish Islam 
managed an interview with the al-Jazeera network and convinced the Arab League of the 
                                                          
28 Cf. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/antiUSprotests/. Cf. also 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactions_to_Innocence_of_Muslims, and Kirkpatrick (2013). 
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seriousness of the case. Only then did the ball start rolling. In December 2005 the 
Congress of the Islamic Organization, put the issue on the agenda of their summit in 
Mecca, and produced the requisite condemnations and demands addressed i.a. at the 
UN. Thus a manufactured chain of events put the Muslim world on fire. Demonstrations, 
attacks on Scandinavian citizens and boycotts of Danish products followed. The official 
balance of this crisis included 139 dead and condemnation of one more artist to a 
supervised life.  
Without going into details or adducing further examples, we can recognize here 
something like a common genealogy: the disturbances usually possess a gradual and 
artificial origin, where a devout Islamist minority manipulates and purposefully 
promotes anger - until it reaches a level where an initially limited and local problem will 
dominate international media. 
In theory, anti-insult demonstrations are not necessarily violent, yet "theatrical" 
violence is part and parcel of the protest repertoire. We observe here a parallel with the 
logic of terrorism: in both cases the gambit is to overvalue the status of the weak and the 
victim – who in today’s world enjoys an ideological advantage – and to produce a 
multiplier effect where a few activists garner a disproportionate media effect. The 
protest serves at once to demonize the West and to propagate conservative or 
fundamentalist readings of Islam. 
One should from the above not conclude that Islam is more violent or anti-modern than 
other religions. What seems undeniable, however, is that the Muslim world is caught in a 
more serious and urgent cultural crisis than those affecting other civilizations - and this 
crisis includes violent, including terroristic manifestations. We are not the first to point 
out that this violence affects a much larger number of Muslims than of non-Muslims; far 
from diminishing the seriousness of the problem, it only exacerbates it. 
What concerns us here, however, is that from the Muslim point of view 
symbolical violence inflicted (subjectively) seems to provoke greater indignation and 
protest than physical violence. Blasphemy, which we might define as "violation of God’s 
rights", seems to instill greater pain in the Muslim community than any violation of its 
human rights in the Western sense. Again, illustrations will make the point. The 
genocide in Darfur in 2003-2006 (and earlier, that of the Iraqi Kurds 1987-89), the 
massacres of the Afghan civil wars (1989-1996 and again since 2003), of the Syrian and 
earlier of the Lebanese civil war (2011-present and 1975-1990, respectively) and many 
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other instances of crimes and serial murder against Muslim civilians, have all attracted 
much less protest of the umma than the burning of a Qur’an by a marginal Florida pastor 
in: for certain groups of Muslims, symbols (after all no more than arbitrary signs that 
refer to something more concrete) are apparently worth more than human lives. Anti-
Islamic groups in the West are eager to provide ammunition to their anger. 
Mutual manipulation of religious symbols has stirred up a war of representations. 
When thinking of strategies to depolarize this situation, we meet a considerable 
challenge in the sacralization of several mundane subjects, mere verbal reference to 
which is already interpreted as intolerable insult to Islam. Thus issues such as the 
origins of Islam or the integrity and "ahistorical" immutability the Qur’an, but also the 
Prophet’s sexual life or in general any criticism of any aspect of Muhammad, become 
untouchable subjects, sheltered against any criticism – whether playful or serious, 
external or intra-Islamic. The same may be observed regarding representation of the 
image of Muhammad – although this is in fact a relatively recent taboo: an "invented 
tradition".29 This new orthodoxy differs from the wider latitude that existed in earlier 
times.30 
 
 
The tendency to delegitimize criticism of Islam  
 
The taboo on the person of the Prophet is an important issue that helps establish 
a criterion to differentiate unacceptable racism from legitimate criticism. Drawing the 
line between the legitimate and the prohibited in human behavior is obviously 
conditioned by the criteria used. And how could these criteria be exempt themselves 
from the same criticism? This brings us back, then, to our initial question: how might 
one legitimately criticize Islam? The central dilemma seems to lie in the difficulty to 
differentiate critique of religion from criticism of Muslims as a group. We need to 
distinguish dogmas, beliefs and worldviews on the one hand, from individuals and 
groups on the other. A faith can be chosen but skin color, nationality, gender, sexual 
orientation and other identity characteristics cannot.. Many people would agree that 
                                                          
29 Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983. 
30 Two recent extreme examples were the planned attack on the fresco of San Petronio in Bologna (2002) 
that represents Muhammad suffering in hell the punishments imagined by Dante in his Divine Comedy; and 
pressures in 2008 to remove medieval Arab images from a Wikipedia article discussing the current trend 
in Islam to prohibit images of the Prophet. 
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anyone has the right to criticize ideas; but that to criticize a person for belonging to a 
group amounts to a discriminatory or even racist or sexist abuse. Since the 
Enlightenment we know that freedom of expression is a constitutive element of 
modernity and a condition for progress; and we hold that equality between citizens 
expresses our dignity as human beings. One may publicly opine that the God of the Old 
Testament is a bigoted Being, spiteful and jealous (or even non-existent). However, he 
may not publicly express the view that the Jews, who developed the monotheistic 
concept, are the cause of all evil and must be exterminated. It is acceptable to reject the 
Yoruba religion of the Orishas, but it is not acceptable to argue that Blacks are an 
inferior race apt to be enslaved. The same distinction can and should be applied between 
Islam and Muslims. 
This criterion to distinguish people from ideas provides a prima facie means to 
determine which expressions are legitimate and which are not (ignoring for now the 
issue if the unacceptable should be prohibited and punished by law or merely socially 
excluded as an undesirable and "politically incorrect" expression). 
However, it is more complicated to apply the criterion when it comes to religion: 
for how is it possible to separate the believer from the content of his belief? The 
dilemma is even more acute with "totalitarian" religions – i.e. those who seek to regulate 
in detail and guide the life of the faithful and demand to be the central anchor of the 
believer’s identity. Such is the case of Orthodox Judaism, certain Christian churches, and 
also Islam: there, elements of the content of religion itself also constitute elements of the 
collective identity of Muslims as a community. 
If we cannot remove this overlap between idea and person, between tenets of the 
Islamic religion, open to criticism like any idea, and the community of Muslims, 
inviolable in the name of their human dignity, then we risk lose our standard of 
determining how far freedom expression goes. It would then be impossible to say that 
hate speech (e.g. in the case of IoM) is illegitimate, but that a high-quality artistic work 
(e.g. Rushdie’s novels) or a scientific analysis which entails criticism (e.g. the text critical 
research of Luxenberg) should be exempt from such a ban.31 
YouTube chose not to take down the IoM movie, reasoning that although the 
video criticized Islam as a religion, it did not denigrate Muslims as a group. The problem 
                                                          
31 Since 2006 British law restricts punishment for libel to cases with malicious intent (in the USA 
protection of free speech is even stronger). Cf. Ruthven (2012). 
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here is that the Prophet Muhammad, seen as the perfect exemplar of the holy as well as 
being a daily presence, almost a virtual (but ubiquitous) member of a Muslim’s family, 
makes him also Islam’s chief symbol: and this turns any criticism of him (particularly 
concerning his sexual behavior, transmitted in detail in the ahadith) into a violation of 
Muslim collective identity.32 
Obviously taboos also exist in the West either as residues of earlier and more 
restrictive eras or as new taboos. Two examples would be pedophilia,33 and the 
Holocaust of the Jews. In 2006 the Arab European League (AEL, Arabisch Europese Liga) 
of activist Dyab Abu Jahjah, an "assertive" Muslim activist in Belgium and Holland, 
published cartoons of questionable taste (e.g. Anne Frank having sex with Hitler) in 
order to unmask an apparently double standard in the West. Immediately sued for anti-
Semitic denigration, the action provided extensive negative publicity to AEL. However, 
the aim of their attack on Western "hypocrisy" was less to express any Muslim anti-
Semitism than to gain equal status for Islamic taboos.34 In other words, a breach of 
taboos that would lead to an expansion of taboos. 
So we see an inflationary process. In a first stage it is the intentional insult that 
offends, next even serious criticism becomes illegitimate (e.g. French Leftist Islamologist 
Maxime Rodinson’s biography of Muhammad, initially regarded as pro-Islamic);35 finally 
the mere reference to a subject, unless prefaced with qualifications and with due 
deference, transmutes into insult to every member of the community. To accept the self-
definition of any one religion as being above any rational inquiry, comes down to 
accepting a priori the old claim (which also existed in Christianity) that there exists a 
                                                          
32 YouTube blocked access to the film in Pakistan and some other Muslim majority countries, probably in a 
pragmatic ad hoc decision. US judiciary ordered in February 2014 removal of IoM from YouTube, 
concurring with the argument of one of the actresses whose life was threatened that she owned copyright 
on representations of her person: cf. http: //www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/26/us-google-youtube-
film-idUSBREA1P1HK20140226 Reuters 02/26/2014. Most recently, lethal attacks have occurred in 
reaction to much lighter "transgressions", e.g. omission of the usual "peace be upon him" formula after 
mention of the Prophet's name. 
33 In the United States not only production but the mere possession of pedophile pornography – sexual 
photographs, and even drawings and stylized cartoons of young children - constitutes a crime: cf. Goode 
2011. 
34 On the cartoon on the AEL website, cf. Belien (2006) and also 
http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartoons_over_Mohammed_in_Jyllands-Posten. An exhibition of cartoons 
ridiculing the Jewish Holocaust was organized in Tehran in 2006 under the auspices of the Ahmadinejad 
government, ostensibly in response to the Danish cartoons. Similar to the above episode, this was officially 
justified by reference to "breaking taboos" though it transparently served ulterior political purposes. 
35 Cf. Rodinson (1961)  and  
http://almuslih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=256:the-maxime-rodinson-
affair&catid=44:islam-in-history&Itemid=214. 
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sacred sphere for the prominence of which reason must bow - that there are things that 
the critical mind is not only unable to understand, but forbidden to approach. This 
means to believe in the primacy of revelation over reason. If one allows as a norm that 
representatives of any religion have the right to decide what counts as acceptable or 
unacceptable, one helps to establish or maintain the a priori supremacy of that religion. 
Islam thus ends up looking like a totalitarian religion, intolerant of any dissent. 
That picture, however, is false, and itself the result of the hegemony in contemporary 
Islam of orthodox and Islamist currents over more moderate trends that follow more 
liberal and rationalist traditions within the faith. Historically these latter schools were 
characterized by openness to debate and to self-criticism. The defeat of the liberal 
current results from an internal struggle within Islam, fought in principle with 
theological arguments, but by groups of extremists also with weapons of intimidation 
and terror. Liberal critics currently face a situation in which theology and representation 
have become constitutive factors of the believers’ collective identity: "If you criticize the 
sexual life of the Prophet, you insult me mortally, an insult that only blood can wash 
away." But defeat of the progressives is not fated to be irreversible. 
We are therefore faced with a paradox: criticism of alleged intolerant and / or 
violent aspects of Islam turns into hate speech, and the critic who points at the 
propensity to violence is rhetorically transformed into author of incitement, whose 
views facilitate or even produce the very violence he or she criticized. Thus criticism of 
hate speech within Islam morphs into Islamophobic discourse, thus making any critical 
examination of Islam becomes illegitimate. It does not harm to restate that a critical 
(always respectful) approach to aspects of any faith should never defame the believer. 
However, it is also clear that the only way to keep a space for critical views lies in 
restoring the distinction between defamation of people and criticism of ideas.  
  
 
2. The responsibility of the author 
 
A second aspect inherent in the question of freedom to criticize Islam is to find 
out to what extent authors are responsible for the consequences of their words. The 
position that each author is answerable for all consequences of his words, direct and 
indirect, immediate and long term, is used by orthodox Muslims and Islamophile 
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publicists alike to delegitimize or censor works critical of Islam; it is used in the same 
way by Islamophobic publicists to combat Islam and even prone prohibition of Islamic 
worship. 
The discussion about harmful effects attributed to representations, and the 
consequent responsibility of their authors or distributors, is not specific to religion. We 
encounter it in controversies as diverse as those about violent video games (do they 
increase the propensity to violence among young users?) and pornography (does access 
to representations of liberal and even violent sex increase the incidence of rape? or does 
representation helps to sublimate and therefore diminish expression of sexual practices 
deemed unacceptable?).36 In the first case, the producer is an (at best poorly informed) 
criminal; in the second he has done nothing wrong. 
Does the same logic apply mutatis mutandis also to creators and disseminators of 
religious representations? 
The case of Nakoula is relatively simple: the author of IoM explicitly intended to 
produce anti-Islamic propaganda, and he got exactly the anti-Western reactions that 
nourish anti-Islamic resentment in the West that he had wished for. There is a 
correspondence between the intention and the result: hence the author is at least co-
responsible for the ensuing violence. The artist’s or researcher’s responsibility for the 
effects of his creation becomes more complicated, however, when the author of 
statements or "blasphemous" representations has no malicious or violent intent, but his 
work includes expressions that are unacceptable from the point of view of guardians of 
the politically correct in Islam. In many countries, the law restricts the responsibility of 
the creator for the content of his creations. Democracies often follow the formula of 
"freedom of expression except in cases that affect public morality or incitement of racial 
hatred or insult of part of the population".  Jurisprudence follows precedent and 
responds to changing social norms. 
To not separate the artistic or scholarly creation from its author leads to 
absurdities that violate our sense of justice. In certain cases, of course, the responsibility 
of intellectuals for the tragedies of the 20th century is clear enough. One thinks of the 
fellow travelers who supported Stalinism, or of pro-Fascist or collaborationist artists and 
authors in the interwar era. The existentialist philosopher Heidegger, father of 
                                                          
36 Incidentally the argument that representation of sex "objectifies” and is offensive to women is the exact 
equivalent of criticism of Islam being in itself an insult to Muslims. 
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postmodernism, was in the 1930s an active collaborator of the Nazis. He never 
disavowed his choice and bears undeniable responsibility for granting intellectual 
respectability to the National Socialist movement.37 However, the argument for the 
intellectual’s responsibility is often used in a far more elastic way. A couple of examples 
may highlight the dilemma. How should we evaluate Nazism’s remoter sources of 
inspiration? Nietzsche, who died 33 years before the Third Reich (which he would have 
excoriated), was also the undemocratic and elitist philosopher of "overcoming of the 
human being" by the Übermensch; Richard Wagner extolled German mythology in his 
operas and was an open anti-Semite (his music is banned in Israel). Both geniuses were 
appropriated as precursors by Nazi ideologues. Would this make us posthumously 
blame Nietzsche for Auschwitz? This seems absurd... 
However, not all cases are so absurd. We now know the extent of Communist 
crimes, in their time covered up by famous writers and philosophers such as G.B. Shaw, 
Gide or Sartre. Stalin pursued and eliminated millions of real and imagined opponents 
and "class enemies". Does his predecessor Lenin, the revolutionary who theorized the 
one-party regime and who established the secret police after the Russian Revolution, 
also bear guilt for the Gulag? And if Lenin is responsible, why not Marx? This is a sliding 
slope with no logical end. Voltaire and the Enlightenment philosophers developed the 
concepts of freedom of thought and of religion. Do they in some way share responsibility 
for the dead due to repression of riots against IoM in Pakistan and elsewhere? 
Theravada monks in Burma attack and burn alive Muslim shopkeepers and students – 
do we blame the Buddha? In his parable of the Grand Inquisitor, Dostoevsky imagines 
that Jesus Christ, had He returned, would have been arrested and executed as a prophet 
of insubordination and a heretic. Would Christianity’s founders have recognized 
themselves in the stakes of the Inquisition? Was the Inquisition the atypical deviation 
into intolerance of a good faith - or did it reflect a violent trait inherent in the Catholic 
Church?38  
Inevitably a parallel imposes itself with the " thought crimes" of Islamophobic 
authors. In 2012 a Norwegian court sentenced to 21 years in jail Anders Breivik, who 
                                                          
37 Martin Heidegger was also guilty of anti-Semitic behavior e.g. against his mentor Edmund Husserl, and 
of hypocrisy e.g. against his ex-girlfriend Hannah Arendt. About Heidegger's relationship with Nazism, cf. 
Farias (1989). Whether or to what extent the philosopher's behavior invalidates his philosophy is 
obviously another question altogether. For intellectual apologists of the USSR (Shaw, Gide, Sartre and 
others) cf. Lilla (2001) and Winock (1999). 
38 Dostoyevsky (1879). 
40 
 Malala, São Paulo, v. 3, n. 5, nov. 2015 
had massacred over 60 people in his struggle against "Marxist multiculturalism" which 
according to him, was disarming the West against the specter of Islamization. Robert 
Spencer was accused of being one of the intellectual inspirations of the killer. Spencer, 
author of controversial books like The politically incorrect guide to Islam (2005) and Did 
Muhammad exist? (2012) as well as director of www.jihadwatch.com, is doubtless anti-
Islamic. Breivik’s 'manifesto' quoted him frequently. However, Spencer has never called 
for physical attacks against Muslims or Islamophiles, but rather looks for verbal duels to 
spread his positions. Is Spencer indirectly guilty of the massacre?39 
The illusionary same logic can be applied to Islamophile voices. Who, beyond the 
suicide terrorists themselves, is morally and intellectually responsible for 9/11? No 
doubt Osama bin Laden, who as he boasted, inspired and organized them. But what 
about Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), the Egyptian ideologue of jihadism who inspired Osama 
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri? Qutb was a radical voice within the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the same that produced Muhammad Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically 
elected president, deposed by a military coup in 2013, which at once outlawed the 
Brotherhood as a “terrorist organization”. Jihadi terrorists, though, claim they do 
nothing but apply Allah’s dictates of as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. Would in 
last instance, then, the founder of Islam be guilty of violence committed by Muslims in 
the name of their religion? Such indeed is the intellectual genealogy traced by authors 
hostile to Islam such as Spencer and Pamela Geller to accuse it as an inherently violent 
and heinous faith: attempts to market an alternative "moderate", modernist and tolerant 
Islam, are for them no more than propaganda tricks. There could exist only one Islam 
and it is the opposite of the "religion of peace" advocated by Muslim apologists and their 
naïve backers. Such indeed is the viewpoint often promoted by anti-Islamic 
propagandists - though not by serious researchers such as Bernard Lewis or by more 
sophisticated critics of Islam such as Daniel Pipes and Martin Kramer. 
Muslims who reject violence naturally defend the opposed perspective: Islam is 
perfect but Muslims are not. Terrorists such as the perpetrators of 9/11 would have 
made a wrong and illegitimate reading of the sacred sources, and arrived at their acts by, 
ultimately, misunderstanding their own religion: one must not blame Islam for that. 
                                                          
39 In a series of articles Robert Spencer attempted to prove that Anders Breivik’s terrorist massacre in 
Norway in 2011 was aimed at destroying the anti-jihadist movement by associating it with Nazism. Cf. 
Spencer (2014), and related articles published around the same time. Cf. also 
http://www.jihadwatch.org/rebuttals and Greenfield (2011). 
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Such explanations are championed by a heterogeneous collection of believers – from 
liberals like Mohammed Arkoun to moderate and gradualist fundamentalists such as 
Yusuf el-Qaradawi and Tariq Ramadan. Some non-Muslim sympathizers of Islam adopt a 
secularized version of the same argument. Jihadists would reach faulty or forced 
interpretations, and responsibility for Islamist violence belongs to those who provoke 
Muslims: Christian (or Jewish, Hindu or atheistic) Islamophobes, Orientalists, or 
Western colonialists and their intellectual paladins.40 
As observers trying to analyze the impact of ideas on immoral behavior, and to 
make sense of the cataclysms human beings inflict on each other in the name of ideas, 
we are therefore torn between two incompatible extremes: would the apostle of an 
ideology or religion (which in its original formulation was often deeply human, tolerant 
and peaceful!) actually be its guiltiest culprit? Or is he completely exempt from all 
liability? Whatever the outcome of this ethical dilemma, the most prudent position 
would be to absolve an author from responsibility for the effects of his or her ideas until 
proof of the opposite. Freedom of speech depends on maintaining a barrier between the 
author and the work. To prevent closing of the space for debate, it is essential to 
maintain the independence of the text vis-à-vis the author. 
  
 
What has priority: the right to criticize or the right to not be offended? Five 
positions 
 
The above remarks on the influence of ideas and representations on (in 
particular immoral) political behavior allow us to construct a taxonomy of attitudes on 
the dilemma about free speech versus religious freedom (including the Muslim believer's 
right not to be insulted in his faith). We may distinguish two "Islamic" positions, 
orthodox and liberal, and two "secularists" or "Western" ones, viz. universalistic and 
relativistic, along with a fifth non-ideological position derived from the sphere of conflict 
management. 
 
 
                                                          
40 Yildirim (2007) and Hitchens & Ramadan (2010). Cf. http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic-statements-
against-terrorism/qaradawi/, Esposito (2002) and Said (2001). 
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(1) Orthodox Islam 
 
The orthodox or conservative Islamic position argues that critique or satire of 
religion equals blasphemy or insult to God. Slandering or ridiculing the Prophet even 
more so since unlike God Muhammad can no longer defend himself, punish or forgive 
the offense - a task that now falls on the umma. This primacy of the honor of God, His 
Prophet and His religion has drastically limited the right to free expression in Islam. 
Without room for criticism, any "aggression" calls forth extreme reactions that 
paradoxically seem to confirm the very "Islamic intolerance" that critical authors 
intended to reveal in the first place.  
This first position corresponds to the traditional Islamic one, and is shared by 
most Islamists and (probably, in theory) by the majority of the Muslim public, although 
only a minority mobilizes in protests.  
 
 
(2) Liberal and modernist Islam 
 
The opposite Islamic, liberal and modernist standpoint affirms that a strong 
religion cannot be harmed by inane insults: "Only the truth can hurt." Muslims should 
not fall into the trap of fighting hate with hate, but practice patience and tolerance. As 
for serious criticism, this should be addressed openly and fearlessly. It necessarily 
addresses the believers and not belief itself: unlike Islam, Muslims are not perfect. 
Muslim modernists want (in various degrees of radicalness) to reform Islam and cleanse 
it of retrograde aspects. There are heated discussions in books, conferences, and online, 
but these probably involve an educated and partially Westernized Muslim elite public.41 
One must bear in mind that both these two currents represent only the two 
extreme poles of what in Islamic social reality is a continuous gamut of opinion. 
Literature is replete with testimonies from Muslims disgruntled with what they 
experience as a too lukewarm or accommodating religiosity, or who are scandalized by 
anti-Muslim aggressions supposedly "engineered" or "applauded” by the West, ensuing 
in radicalization. However, the opposite also exists. Researchers Ed Husain and Maajid 
Nawaz were Islamist radicals before they turned into moderate reformists. There are 
                                                          
41 Rushdie (2005). 
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former Muslims like Wafa Sultan or Ayaan Hirsi Ali whose criticism is so fundamental 
they can no longer be considered believers, but who still remain "cultural Muslims"; still 
others we may call "peripheral Muslims", such as Irshad Manji or the Only Quran 
Muslims.42 
 
 
(3) Western universalism  
 
In the West the watershed runs today less between Left and Right than between 
universalism and relativism. Universalists tend to value freedom of expression above 
religious freedom. Democracy and Human Rights can only flourish in a context of near-
absolute freedom of expression, including the freedom to criticize that may offend social 
or religious norms.43 This rationalist and liberal position - in the eyes of his detractors 
"Enlightenment fundamentalism" - seems to confirm the conservative Islamic caricature 
of a West devoid of norms or God, fit and ripe for the kill. The universalistic position is 
defended by libertarians such as Noam Chomsky and Christopher Hitchens, Pascal 
Bruckner and other French "new philosophers" and by authors of Third World origin 
(not all of them Muslim) who found a more receptive home for their opinions in the 
West, such as Kwame Appiah, Hirsi Ali and Irshad Manji.44 
 
 
(4) Relativist multiculturalism  
 
The opposite pole is hard relativistic multiculturalism. Starting from the axioms 
that it is wrong to apply Western values to non-Western societies and that universal 
norms that are not culturally determined are impossible to find, relativists defend limits 
on freedom of expression, at least within Western society and about other cultures. 
                                                          
42 Ed Husain and Majid Nawaz later established the Quilliam Foundation, an anti-extremist NGO: Husain 
(2007); Nawaz (2013). Cf. Ibn Warraq (2003), Sultan (2009) and Manji (2003). Appiah (2005 and 2006) is 
philosopher of culture at Princeton and New York University. 
43 This stance has even been advocated by Noam Chomsky (1980) who lent his prestige to legitimize 
publication of negationist theses of Robert Faurisson by writing a foreword for his Mémoire en défense. 
44 French philosopher Pascal Bruckner (2007) introduced the concept of "Enlightenment fundamentalism" 
(which he defends) in his advocacy of Ayaan Hirsi Ali against Ian Buruma and Timothy Garton Ash. His 
critique of the alleged facile pro-Third World relativism of the Western intellectual Left is in Bruckner 
(1983) and (2006). The viewpoints of Ali (2007) and (2010) and Manji (2005) has parallels with Appiah’s  
liberal cosmopolitan universalism. 
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Criticism that approaches offense is to be rejected. Rejecting the values and practices of 
other communities violates not only the respect owed to their otherness, but upholding 
our own values (regarding which confusion reigns!) over and against those of the other 
would also threaten conflict: and, reminding us of the many unjust wars waged by 
western colonizers and imperialists multiculturalists warn that the wiser course is to 
avoid the risk of fresh injustices. 
Again it is interesting to note the multiple subdivisions, overlays and transfers 
that exist in the secular field too. Thus the viewpoint defending the right of Muslim 
communities to determine in their own sphere - and dictate to their coreligionists - the 
boundary between the licit and the illicit may be inspired by epistemological or even 
moral relativism; on the other hand, many Christians and conservatives are quite 
absolutist in their own values and embrace pro-Islamic positions not out of any value 
relativism but because Islam’s non-permissive values correspond with their own, or 
because of isolationism (e.g. John Esposito, Pat Buchanan, or Rowan Williams).45 What is 
at stake from the Christian side seems sometimes a transposition of the old censorship 
that restricted the freedom to criticize Christian sacred cows into a desire to limit such 
freedom when speaking of the taboos of the Other. Last year’s Orientalists are today 
accused of peddling caricatured representations of "the Orient". Today it is legitimate to 
satirize Western taboos but no longer those of other cultures. Perhaps feelings of guilt 
about the colonial past are thus exorcised. On the other hand, one suspects that some 
monocultural conservatives disguise their Islamophobia behind Enlightenment 
arguments, while actually blaming Islam collectively for the ills that afflict the West. 
Despite occasional opacities (willful or not), the contrast between universalistic 
and relativistic perspectives is substantial. Western ambivalence concerning progressive 
and/or pro-Western Muslims who are critical of their own Islam, illustrates the gap 
between both philosophies. Salman Rushdie, Ibn Warraq, Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Irshad 
Manji plus a small galaxy of other critical Muslim and apostate Muslim stars demand 
internal reform of Islam, reject anti-Semitism as well as the axiom of Islamic supremacy, 
claim rights in Islam for women, minorities, and gays, and seek to harmonize faith with 
modernity. Universalists applaud these celebrities and are eager to parade them as 
                                                          
45 These three authors markedly differ among themselves, though they have in common a Christian 
orientation. The prolific student of Islam John Esposito, director of the Prince Alwaleed Center for Muslim-
Christian Understanding at Georgetown, is Catholic, as is the paleoconservative politician Pat Buchanan, 
who sees Islam as a potential anti-modern ally. Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams has 
defended incorporation of shari‘a in British law for British Muslims. 
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"positive Muslims" who exemplify the potential of coexistence. They are not popular 
among Western relativists, who accuse them of generating problems between Muslims 
and others, and of being too ignorant or too westernized (if not bribed) to represent 
"authentic" Islam. 
The exact opposite occurs with Muslim intellectuals closer to orthodoxy, who 
engage in dialogue all the while maintaining a more distant and critical stance vis-à-vis 
Western civilization, such as Tariq Ramadan: applauded by relativists such as Ian 
Buruma and Timothy Garton Ash, he is kept at arm’s length by more vigilant 
universalists such as feminist Caroline Fourest or socialist Paul Berman, always ready to 
detect in his writings or speeches signs of an anti-modern Islamism.46 
 
 
(5) Pragmatic peaceful coexistence 
 
"It's not smart to offend those who may want to kill you": We can point at a fifth 
position that is less ideological and more guided by the need to avoid destructive conflict 
and to manage and solve them as they emerge. One can embrace the universal value of 
free expression and yet accept that under certain circumstances it must be limited: for 
violence must be avoided, and conflict needs to be resolved non-violently. Even though 
our values may be right, we still share in the responsibility towards the victims of their 
overly brutal imposition. This position appreciates results regardless of the justice of 
motives ("the end justifies the means") and thus differs from all previous viewpoints 
which, in varying degree are all deontological, i.e. mandating action based on righteous 
principles, regardless of consequences. 
This classification obviously does not exhaust all existing and politically relevant 
views on the relationship between Islam and the West – we have in fact included only 
the relatively moderate! None of the five positions would accept intentional offense to 
groups of believers – but meanwhile they differ among themselves in their response to 
serious (scientific, philosophical or artistic) criticism of the contents of a religion 
regarded as inviolable by most Muslims. Two positions, Western and Islamic liberal 
universalistic, value freedom of expression above concerns for taboo: they also view the 
challenge of coexistence as a shared challenge for Muslims and infidels. Two other 
                                                          
46 Fourest (2008). Cf. Berman (2009). 
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positions value hold protection of faith higher than freedom of expression: orthodox 
Islam does so in the name of the supremacy of revelation, and secular relativism on 
behalf of deference to Muslim “alterity”; they also hold in common Western 
responsibility for the failure of coexistence. The fifth, pragmatic, position peaceful 
coexistence values as supreme and may sin through exaggerated caution. 
 
Virtual terrorism: Islamophobes against radical Islamists - two extremes seeking 
polarization 
 
In the public storm caused by the IoM video as in other similar cases, offenders 
and offended are, in a first moment, exponents of extremist minorities: radical 
Islamophobes who want to provoke Muslims in general, and succeed in provoking 
radical Islamists. The former are often Christian (or, in some cases, secular, Jewish, 
Hindu or Buddhist) fundamentalists or Fascists.47 As for the latter, they include various 
streams. Impressionistically, activist Sunni salafis and jihadis and their acolytes seem to 
stand out. Muslim youth of Western and Central European big cities, poorly integrated 
and alienated from or antagonistic to Western values, are strongly represented, but one 
finds also converts and others.  
It is important to remember that the ideological fringes are broader and more 
malleable than these ideologized cores. Not nearly all universalists are attracted to 
Islamophobia, nor are all observant Muslims to extreme Islamism. However, the radical 
currents dominate today’s discursive scene. 
Islamophobes and Islamists possess each a relatively large and in all likelihood 
growing margin of supporters susceptible to their arguments. As yet each of these 
extreme poles represents only a minority.  However, each exerts disproportionate 
influence over its own “constituency”, due to the consistency of their respective 
ideologies, and the general atmosphere of doubt and of loss of certainties and 
demoralization affecting their political competitors in the West and the Islamic world 
respectively.  
What radical Islamophobes and Islamists have in common is that they both want 
                                                          
47 Jewish anti-Islamic violence has occurred in terrorist acts (such as arson of mosques) of extremist 
settlers in the West Bank in the framework of their “price tag” policy. In India, radical currents of Hindu 
fundamentalist party Bharatiyya Janata Party and its Shiv Sena militia have been responsible for many 
instances of anti-Muslim violence. Buddhist-Muslim communal tensions recently exploded into anti-
Muslim pogroms in western Burma against the Rohingyas, and southern Thailand against Malays. 
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to foster a clash of civilizations, a new religious war – which they believe they can win – 
to be fought by political and rhetorical or – for the extremists - military means. Not all 
who criticize or hate Islam want to "cleanse " the West of Muslims, but the trend is to 
press for limits on their influx, to force their assimilation and to empty public space of 
Islamic content. In parallel, not all Islamists reject all West-associated values, but their 
trend is to restrict democracy and human rights to issues considered compatible with 
shari‘a, and to establish "liberated zones" free of Western influence and governed by 
Islamic law. Both ideologies can be considered fundamentalist, convinced of the truth of 
their own belief and of the reality of a nefarious cultural, demographic or economic 
"invasion", planned and executed by the 'enemy':  the other civilization. 
Followers of either camp understand their stakes as a zero sum game which the 
enemy is winning, and where the result will depend on an eleventh hour intervention of 
an "enlightened" minority to convince the ill-guided and/or indifferent majority of their 
own camp. Both Islamophobes and Islamists tend to pessimism on the prospects of 
coexistence with the other civilization, however, each considers fighting against (or 
converting) the moderates within their own community as the more pressing immediate 
task. In the medium term, though, war is inevitable and corresponds to the will of God or 
of History. Both also use mirror “ricocheting” provocation strategies that follow a logic 
similar to terrorism: (a) the "good community" hurts the "enemy camp” – speaking 
blasphemy functions as the verbal/symbolical pain-inducing equivalent of a violent 
terrorist act; (b) the insult leads the enemy to take revenge against the majority of this 
“block of the Good”, from whose members came the original provocation; (c) revenge 
strikes the majority, and the pain inflicted brings about an ideological realignment 
between the tepid members of the "good" community with the positions of its radical 
“vanguard”. 
Within this strategy, a key tactic employed across the board is to formulate 
claims that are insoluble or impossible to fulfill without a total cultural war. One 
example is the demand often voiced by Geert Wilders of Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) to 
ban the Qur’an in the same way as Hitler’s Mein Kampf is banned in the Netherlands. 
Much more extreme is the Norwegian Anders Breivik who called for a violent campaign 
against multiculturalists.  Obviously implementing any such program is incompatible 
with the principles of peaceful coexistence of diverse groups within a heterogeneous 
democratic society. A ban on the Qur’an would be absurd for any Muslim. Breivik’s plan 
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would lead to a continent-wide civil war throughout Europe. 
Equally, acceptance of the demands of extreme Muslim fundamentalists would 
mean the end of Western society. Thus Islamists demanded not just censorship and 
prohibition of IoM and punishment of its producers48 - within American political and 
legal context, already unrealistic demands in themselves – they also blame the US and 
the West collectively for having allowed production of the movie. They demanded 
censorship, apology, and a promise of non-repetition, and on beforehand threatened 
violence in case their demands were not met. However, the demands are by their nature 
impossible to fulfill in a regime of free expression: no government could control the 
content of the Internet or YouTube without introducing a comprehensive regime of 
preventive censorship. This would not only pose technological challenges49 but also be 
incompatible with the civil and human rights that underpin democratic society. 
Moreover, the very universalistic basis of modern democratic society would, in the event 
of acceptance of the ultimatum of the offended Muslims, dictate a further expansion of 
taboos: it would be just as impossible to legislate a prohibition to offend Islam as it was 
to outlaw in France the use of only the veil. The principle of equality obliged French 
lawmakers to ban  from public space all "religious symbols”  (crosses, Jewish kippa etc.). 
A similar universalistic logic, then, would require a ban on criticism of any religion.50 
That would open the door to totalitarian controls that would in no time put an end to 
open society. In the long term that would make society less creative because 
communicative social action is the very basis of human emancipation - not by 
coincidence humankind’s evolutionary path most hateful to fundamentalists of all 
stripes! 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
48 In the case of IoM the actors fear today for their lives. They say they were deceived, accepting roles in a 
film with an apparently innocent script, and that their voices were subsequently dubbed with messages 
insulting Islam: cf. Risling (2012). 
49 Cf. the difficulties encountered in China, Iran, Cuba and related regimes to deny their populations 
thirsting for freedom and information access to the forbidden fruits of the Internet. 
50 It is precisely in this sense that the Islamic Conference Organization, the "United Nations" of the Muslim 
states, would like to amend the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2013). : http://www.euro-
islam.info/wpcontent/uploads/pdfs/islamphobia_rep_May_2010_to_April_2011_en.pdf. Cf. 
http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2012/11/new-calls-from-islamists-for-international-blasphemy-
law-at-un; Kern (2013). 
49 
 Malala, São Paulo, v. 3, n. 5, nov. 2015 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
As noted in the beginning of this analysis, IoM is no exception. It is a symptom. 
We cannot turn a blind eye to the developments of the last decades - essentially since 
the end of the Cold War: an ascending line of ever more representative provocations of 
Islamophobic actors against the Muslim world. These provocations, understood by their 
perpetrators as a response to the supposed inassimilable and violent otherness of Islam 
have led to increasingly frequent violent reactions from the side of Islamists: thus they 
appear to be self-fulfilling prophecies. Islamophobic attacks are in general limited to the 
terrain of representation: words and imagery rather than physical acts, while radical 
Islamist reactions are often of a physical nature, imposing a higher price in blood and 
lives. This does not mean that Islamophobic acts have necessarily lesser impact. In the 
West the highest sensitivity refers to human life, while the Muslim world focuses on 
violations of a symbolic order - eventually the unrest triggered by novels, cartoons and 
videos perceived as blasphemous may end up having a high human price. We do not 
argue that without symbolic Islamophobic attacks such as the Muhammad cartoons or 
IoM there would be no Islamist "counterattacks" such as on Charlie Hebdo - only that 
Islamophobic acts throw oil on the fire. Additionally anti-Islamic "blasphemy" coming 
from the West is instrumental in radicalize the Islamic ideological spectrum, and 
provides ammunition to violent jihadis in their discussions with salafi and other non-
violent Islamist currents. 
Anyway, radical Islamists, with their reactions, tend to fall open-eyed into the 
traps laid by their anti-Islamic critics. Both want to stir up a war of civilizations. 
Radical Islamists and Islam-haters are still some way from realizing this goal. 
Even so we see already severe side effects of their struggle: one of the most significant of 
these is the shrinking space for serious and non-malicious critique of Islam. This 
shrinkage is the outcome of physical intimidation by radical Islamists together with the 
verbal policing and censorship imposed in Western democracies by certain intellectuals 
and journalists: this Islamophile intelligentsia risks becoming a fifth column of "useful 
idiots" tethered to the cause of Islamism. To this one must add fear-driven self-
censorship. 
A society that restricts freedom of expression will eventually prohibit freedom of 
thought. Limiting the freedom of ideas sabotages society's resources to address the very 
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serious problems threatening human coexistence. It also diminishes our humanity. 
However, when freedom of expression is abused to damage the dignity of communities 
that make up this society, and causes feelings of loss and anger or even communal 
violence, there also occurs, beyond the immediate human suffering, a waste of social 
capital difficult to retrieve or rebuild. Few evil acts have a worse destabilizing potential 
than religious insults. And no other major religion is more obsessed with blasphemy 
than Islam. It is elementary that freedom to criticize is conditioned on some criterion to 
distinguish serious criticism from deliberate slander. That criterion, however, is not 
immediately identifiable. How to escape from this dilemma? To be effective, any 
depolarizing strategy would probably need to simultaneously combine three elements: 
to maintain in an attenuated form the outlawing of hate speech against religious 
communities and other identity groups; to protect unfettered freedom of expression for 
critique of religion; and to release critical Muslim and ex-Muslim authors and artists 
from their ghettoization-by-association with the Islamophobic Right, and to seriously 
engage their arguments.  
  
 
(1) To accept of the ban on hate speech (but define it better) 
 
The first step to tackle the problem is to recognize that it exists. We saw above 
the destructive entanglement of Islamophobic provocations and violent Muslim 
reactions, which seemingly confirm the anti-Islamic analysis, thus encouraging further 
provocations, new counter reactions, and fueling a vicious circle. In democratic 
countries a good portion of the public may well be prepared to mitigate freedom of 
expression to protect religious groups against insult. The first strategy would protect 
freedom of expression, but without unnecessarily alienating masses of Muslims, keeping 
in place the prohibition of hate speech, but defining it in a more restrictive way, i.a. 
assuming an author’s good intention until proven otherwise. Intentions are notoriously 
difficult to prove, but such a clause would provide a protection for authors, artists and 
researchers whose work may involves bona fide criticism of Islam (or any other religion 
or philosophy): is key to protect or recapture this terrain. 
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(2) Muslims are entitled to protection, Islam not  
 
Allegations by anti-Islamic observers of a prevailing Western blindness to 
Islamist excesses are unfortunately not baseless.51 Whether because of intimidation, 
colonial guilt, values confusion, principled relativism or of still others causes, the cases 
of passivity, excuses and cover-ups are quite numerous. A detailed analysis of these 
factors falls outside the scope of this article. The consequences, however, are negative. 
The popular perception that Islam is above the law can only encourage tolerance of the 
opposite – of coarse criticism or worse. Here the challenge is to combat the undue 
indulgence to a gamut of problematic expressions and behaviors on the part of 
traditional and militant Muslims - but to do so without falling into the traps of 
xenophobia or cultural protectionism. 
  
(3) To retrieve and enlist the vanguard of "critical Muslims" 
 
Lastly, two marriages of convenience need to be broken up: one, that of the 
conservative and monoculturalistic Islamists (who axiomatically believe their religion is 
supreme and the West decadent) with Western multiculturalists; and that of reformist 
and liberal Muslims with a certain Islamophobic Right that masquerades as progressive 
universalism. Automatic association of moderate, critical, progressive and pro-Human 
Rights democratic Muslims (as well as ex-Muslim "apostates" but who have culturally 
remained Muslim) with the Islamophobic Right is an important ideological resource for 
radical Islamists, as it turns the voice of the critical Muslim into that, innocent and 
despicable, of the token Muslim. That perception must be reversed. It is obvious but 
bears repeating that both the West and the causes of international peace and of non-
violent resolution of conflicts have an interest in strengthening moderate Muslims. The 
critical Muslim fringe residing and operating in the West - often the only environment 
where they can operate safely – is a vanguard that constitutes a crucial resource in the 
fight against Islamophobia and anti-Western Islam at once. Those intellectuals in the 
West who reject these thinkers and activists should rethink their position and help win 
back this Muslim vanguard. 
In the end reconquering space for a legitimate critique and contestation of 
                                                          
51 Many examples in Caldwell (2009), e.g. pp. 247-268, Chapter 9: "Tolerance and Impunity". 
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misogynistic and violent ideas and practices within the traditionalist and fundamentalist 
Islam can only be done by Muslims themselves - including the Westernized "fringe" 
mentioned above. What the West’s non-Islamic civil society can do is to build up the 
credibility of the forces for coexistence, preparing a hospitable zone for critical Muslims 
who are de facto allies - and more generally for the Muslim communities living in our 
midst. Human Rights of Muslims must be assiduously protected but - and this is perhaps 
the most difficult challenge – without surrendering to the blackmail claim that the 
content of their religion forms an integral and unassailable part of Muslim identity: that 
would place an insuperable barrier immunizing Islam itself against the corrosive effect 
of critical reason. The immediate task here is therefore to dismantle the dangerous but 
ever more common argument - promoted by many Muslim states - that criticism of Islam 
equals racism. Legitimacy of the critique of religion was the most fundamental tenet of 
the Enlightenment. It is the original expression of freedom of thought and, thus 
constitutes the foundation of modernity. Censorship of ideas fatally leads in time to the 
closure of other spheres: mutatis mutandis it is tantamount to that "closing of the doors 
of free interpretation" (ijtihad) which condemned the Islamic civilization in the last 
millennium to its gradual decline and loss of creativity. Only the greatest possible 
freedom for all may lay the foundations for a new era of shared civilization between 
human beings of all faiths and beliefs. 
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